easy off

Kiley got let down easy.  He started this whole mess when he was the commander at WRAMC just a few years ago.  His successor looked up to Kiley for help - and got none.  When Kiley's successor retired, Weightman entered the fray - and bore the shame of Kiley's mess when he was fired - relieved of his command - just six months into his tour.
And Kiley sat at WRAMC and tried to defend himself, passing the buck all the while.  He started this CF (military slang for big mess) and didn't try to fix it even when promoted to a more powerful position with greater capability to make the changes they needed to make.
The Army isn't poor!  These troops were outpatients - put them in a hotel!  Use a van to transport them.  If a patient can't ride in a van then that patient gets priority for a room in near-by barracks.  Its not that hard - Generals can make decisions like this, they have that power.

In the wake of all his own damage, Kiley gets to just fade away and will be honored at some dog-and-pony show retirement party.  The money spent on his retirement celebration could probably pay for lodging for half the troops that were stuck in building 18 to stay at the Ritz downtown.

equivocation

Back when I was at School equivocation was as bad as lying.
How times have changed.
This morning I read in the Leaf Chronicle about Med Hold at BACH and yesterday about BACH's eagerness to hear suggestions for change.

Sugestions for change need go no further that the Complaint Box at the Patient Representative's office. Or even the notes from past Town Hall meetings with patients in Medical Hold.

The majority of providers at BACH are WONDERFUL - I personally had great experiences with my providers.

The providers who accept roles as administrators become a problem. As an administrator priorities CAN shift from patient care to systematic MANAGEMENT - and all too often the two clash.

Case managers may not be overworked - but their loyalties are to the process before the patient and that is a major systematic problem that must change.

And while BACH will, only with threat of exposure, allow patients to seek treatment outside the walls of BACH, BACH providers are known to prevent follow-through of this outside care. BACH's non-specialized general practitioners often over-rule the recommendations for treatment made by Vanderbilt or other MEDCEN specialty-trained doctors.

Most disturbing has been BACH's management of complaints made by patients. The leadership's actions have made no changes to quality of care concerns brought by patients.

Instead of closing Open Investigations, BACH allows the providers in question to deploy. Deploying the problem only drags the investigation. Worse yet, if that provider is under investigation they are now exposing deployed soldiers to known and unnecessary risk.

But none of that is in the articles in the Leaf Chronicle. The BACH leadership carefully crafted their talking points to avoid more in-depth questioning.

After major lawsuits BACH built a new "Mother-Baby Unit." Spouses can sue for malpractice, service members can't.

So, applying the backward logic so prevalent in the Military, especially the Military Medical System, it would appear that all "questionable providers" see the most vulnerable and voiceless soldiers while all the reputable providers see the other patients.

Like I said, I had an awesome experience at the hospital. I was fortunate to not have an administrator operating on me.

monetary and staff problems at WRAMC

But these problems only came to this point because of leadership failures. Somewhere in the chain of command or concern a leader failed to provide accurate reports and another failed to inspect within their sphere.
The Army probably doesn't need more money - but there needs to be accounting of Total Military spending to ensure proper spending priorities. I'm one of those guys that worries about contractors over-charging for services and lining the pockets of corporate execs at the expense of Military Readiness Spending. I would rather have had more bullets, even toilet paper for that matter, than to have Internet and satellite TV available.
But the Military spends the money congress sends (or the prez pushes) on "stuff," I'd really like to know what "stuff" is. Half of the "wazzuu" expensive toys we take to the sandbox suck. They break or just don't work with other systems already in place. Computer programs don't share the same platforms - but what difference does it make when the sand ruins the electronics.
I'm sure Walter Reed could have found money SOMEWHERE to make sure soldiers were well cared-for. The Army CAN authorize TLA - Temporary Lodging Allowances - to house soldiers in adequate living conditions. But in order to save money the administrators (they don't deserve to be called leaders anymore) tucked the troops away and hoped that no one would look.

Plan? What Plan?

When I was in Ranger School I can remember one of the best lessons I ever learned. I was the Platoon Sergeant for a mission and had to write paragraph 4 of the OPORD (Operations Order – this is the tool used by the Army in planning any mission). I barely did anything with the OPORD, that was up to the Platoon Leader to write, I was just going to make sure everyone was awake (food and sleep deprivation at Ranger School made us all want to catch some zz's whenever we could). One of the Ranger Instructors approached me wanting to know what I was doing. I told him I was making sure everyone was awake. He told me to get to work on the OPORD paragraph 4 – that was my job for now. Without skipping a beat he began to explain the importance of the P4 tasks. To that point we had really only focused on Paragraphs 1-3, the actual operation itself. Paragraph 4 was for all the behind the scenes, non-flashy stuff. But Paragraph 4 is probably, as I now know, the most essential Paragraph to the OPORD. This paragraph includes the Medical Evacuation Plan (MEDEVAC). What this RI explained to me was that this Paragraph fueled a soldiers motivation to fight hard and not cower behind his rucksack when the bullets start flying. If a soldier knows that they will be cared for if shot, or worse, the will fight harder knowing that. The Ranger Creed obligates us to “Never leave a fallen comrade,” and the details of the MEDEVAC plan enhance soldiers’ faith that leaders will not only not abandon them, but have a plan to take care of them, especially in the “golden hour,” where life hangs in the balance.

The shittily planned Iraq war had no Paragraph 4. The only large scale logistics have been pocket padding to high-paying politicos. The only MEDEVAC plan is failing. Look only as far as any Army hospital to see the sad state of affairs for wounded soldiers. They are the forgotten ones. Those who live on impaired are forgotten and further punished with he burdens of their injuries and the sketchy medical care they receive. And once the VA takes over – shit, where do I start.

How long will it be before soldiers realize that there is no MEDEVAC plan and they lose the will to fight at all?

Too little too late

Where does the buck stop??
So Weightman was only in Command for 6 months -- who was there 6 months ago and what did they do about this? Those kinds of structural problems don't happen in a few months - we're talking years of abandonment.
What next? What happens after this knee-jerk reaction settles? Will there be follow-up but the administration? Walter Reed is supposed to be the Flag Ship of Army medicine.
Actually the problems at Reed are fairly simple when considering the problems at other hospitals - the ones out of range of national reporting - like here at Ft. Campbell.

These failures are directly linked to the administrations failures in the preparation for war.